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Abstract
Current image coding standards provide limited support for privacy and security features. An exception is the JPSEC
standard, which defines security extensions in JPEG 2000 specifications (part 8). Notwithstanding this shortcoming,
the JPEG committee is currently defining a new JPEG Systems standard, which envisages privacy and security support
across JPEG family of standards. In this manuscript, the main philosophy of this emerging specification is outlined
along with typical use cases, main requirements as well as examples of potential technological solutions. The
upcoming specification guarantees backward and forward compatibility with earlier standards and legacy
implementations. Finally, we illustrate the introduced framework by two applications targeting secure photo sharing
on social networks and IPR management in the GLAM sector.
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1 Review
1.1 Introduction
In social networks, the widespread use of smart mobile
devices with high-resolution cameras and user-friendly
applications have made photo sharing an easy and there-
fore popular activity. Though almost all existing social
networking services provide photo sharing capabilities,
most of them lack a sound scheme to protect their users’
privacy. A photo —‘worth a thousand words’ — contains
a great amount of potentially privacy sensitive informa-
tion both in the image data and in its associated metadata.
Moreover, photos shared on online social networks can
be accessed and commented easily and quickly by people
and content analysis algorithms, resulting in most pho-
tos being tagged with additional information potentially
disclosing further privacy sensitive information such as
identification data.
Professional organizations, as those in the GLAM (Gal-
leries, Libraries, Archives and Museums) sector, deal with
a huge number of digital images and confronted with
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additional problems. In many cases, those images have
associated IPR (Intellectual Property Rights), implying
that their access and usage should be controlled. In this
particular case, the challenge is focused on the fact that
access to images needs to be controlled based on specific
privacy policies or rules, as well as IPR conditions. There-
fore, mechanisms are needed to both specify the policies
and to enforce them.
Unfortunately, few structural solutions have been
devised so far that can be deployed in an interoperable
way such that privacy and security can be guaranteed and
deployed in legacy image processing applications without
breaking existing workflow. Particularly, signalling syntax
needs to be provided that enables the communication and
protection of privacy and security sensitive parts in the
image data.
The majority of images exchanged nowadays on digi-
tal communication channels are in JPEG format defined
by the Joint Photographic Experts Group (JPEG). JPEG
activities are carried out within a Working Group under
a Joint Technical Committee formed by the International
Standardization Organization (ISO) and the International
Electrotechnical Committee (IEC), formally known as
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ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 29/WG 1 [1]. In this committee, stan-
dards are often defined in collaboration with the Inter-
national Telecommunication Union. Prominent examples
are the JPEG-1 (ISO/IEC 10918-1|ITU-T Recommen-
dation T.81) and JPEG 2000 (ISO/IEC 15444-1 |ITU-T
Recommendation T.800) standards [2]. More recently,
standards addressing particular application domains such
as high dynamic range imaging and low complexity, low
latency coding have been defined, respectively, JPEG XT
(ISO/IEC 18477) and JPEG XS (ISO/IEC 21122). The
JPEG committee is currently seeking for solutions to
embed support for privacy and security functionality in all
its standards.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows:
Section 1.2 outlines a few use cases focused on social net-
work and photo sharing, ephemeral photo sharing and IPR
signalling for the GLAM sector. Section 1.3 discusses the
scope of the JPEG Privacy and Security standardization
framework, and Section 1.4 details JPEG Systems philos-
ophy and technology in which the aforementioned frame-
work will be integrated. Next, Section 1.5 illustrates the
core principles of this framework in a secure transmorph-
ing application and an IPR policy management service for
the GLAM sector. Finally, conclusions are formulated in
Section 2.
1.2 Privacy and Security use cases in image workflows
System-level and generic support for privacy and security
protection features are of utmost importance for use cases
ranging from image workflows such as image repositories
with controlled access, publication and image annotation,
medical imaging, privacy preserving search, video surveil-
lance, social networking and photo sharing, ephemeral
photo sharing, forensic image analysis, to countering ter-
rorism [3].
As illustrated, some prominent use cases relevant in the
scope of this special issue are highlighted in the following
paragraphs, allowing for the identification of privacy and
security requirements.
1.2.1 Social networking and photo sharing
Online social networking environments are sophisticated
platforms connecting a large number of users and hence
enabling complex social interactions. Information trav-
els extremely fast on these networks, and therefore, they
give rise to problematic privacy concerns. Proliferation
of smart mobile devices with high-resolution cameras
and user-friendly social network applicationsmakes photo
sharing an easy and therefore popular activity. Photos
can potentially disclose a significant amount of privacy
sensitive information, not only contained in the image
data as such but also in the associated metadata. More-
over, on online social networking environments, shared
photos can be accessed and commented or tagged easily
by people as well as content analysis algorithms, poten-
tially disclosing or enabling the disclosure of even more
privacy-related information. Furthermore, this Personally
Identifiable Information (PII) [4] may cause additional
security issues in particular applications.
Almost all existing social networking services provide
photo sharing capabilities, but most of them lack effi-
cient privacy protection solutions for their users. After the
reports of citizens being monitored by potential employ-
ers or governmental agencies and leakage of sensitive
private photos online, people’s concern about their online
privacy is growing and a solution that would allow for
access policy control and distribution is becoming highly
desirable.
1.2.2 Ephemeral photo sharing
The enormous success of smart mobile devices has made
communication between people extremely easy and fast.
In particular, photo sharing raises much more privacy
concerns — as indicated in the previous section — than
that of traditional texts as a photo can contain or reveal
rich privacy sensitive information.
Ephemeral information sharing, especially photo shar-
ing, which allows a user to share photos in an ephemeral
way choosing to have the photos disappear after a pre-
set interval, has become increasingly popular. Users can
preconfigure an interval during which other friends can
access the original or cleared versions of their shared
photo. In another scenario, a user can revoke the access
right of certain users to a shared photo at any time as
he or she prefers. Examples of such applications include
the most famous Snapchat [5], Yovo [6], Privately [7] and
Dstrux [8]. However, most current solutions to ephemeral
photo sharing rely on a secure server to store the origi-
nal image data and to enforce the access control. It would
be very useful if image file formats could incorporate the
ability of dynamic access control to image data such that
any device and application can easily apply it as a solution
for ephemeral photo sharing.
1.2.3 GLAM sector
The GLAM (Galleries, Libraries, Archives and Museums)
sector often deals with high-value digital art reproduc-
tions. In this domain, it is crucial that such artefacts can
be protected, both in an active as well as in a passive
way. For example, correct IPR signalling is paramount. It
is a common practice to embed IPR information within
the image metadata. However, currently, the information
is not always embedded in a uniform way. This situa-
tion makes it complicated for applications to inform their
users in a clear and consistent way. In addition, active
protection is sometimes desired. For example, somemeta-
data might only be accessible to certain users, or sim-
ilar to the ephemeral photo sharing use case, a visual
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watermark can be added that can only be removed after
proper authentication. GLAM Institutions might have
within their collections images carrying ‘privacy-sensitive’
information, such as photographic material of identifi-
able individuals. For the exploitation of these images,
the relevant legal framework concerning privacy and
data protection must be taken into account. Finally,
integrity and authenticity check should allow sharing as
a trusted source as well as identification of potential
modifications made to an artefact. An example frame-
work targeting these scenarios is elaborated in the Section
‘IPR management for GLAM sector’ under ‘Example
Applications’.
1.3 JPEG Privacy and Security
In response to these market needs, the JPEG commit-
tee has initiated a standardization process to enable pri-
vacy and security support in its various standards. This
activity is formally known as JPEG Systems part 4 ‘Pri-
vacy, Security and IPR features’ or ISO/IEC 19566-4.
JPEG Privacy and Security intends to provide a degree
of trust while sharing image content and metadata.
Simultaneously, it will allow the signalling of the associ-
ated policies. It targets technical solutions for resolving
privacy and security issues, which are compliant with
legacy technology in the domain, i.e. both image cod-
ing as well as metadata standards that signal information
such as access policies and IPR conditions. The work
on JPEG Privacy and Security is currently in progress
and is expected to become an international standard in
early 2019.
The earlier described use cases were gathered by the
JPEG committee during three workshops in Brussels [9],
La Jolla [10] and Chengdu [11]. These workshops involved
the participation of stakeholders of the different addressed
markets. Stakeholders included academia, not-for-profit
organizations, government agencies, lawyers and news
agencies. Based on these interactions with stakeholders
a set of key desired functionalities has been identified.
Supported functionality in JPEG Privacy and Security
includes access to partial or complete image data and
metadata, independent protection of image data and
metadata, hierarchical levels of access, support for privacy
policies, provenance signalling, authenticity checking, sig-
nalling mechanisms to avoid stripping off metadata and
support for file carving.
Every use case needs specific dedicated protection tools.
For example, in some cases, invisible watermarks or fin-
gerprints could be more suited than traditional encryp-
tion. However, it is important to note that JPEG does not
intend to standardize any of the underlying technologies
but rather aims to formalize the way these are signalled
and applied to JPEG images. As such, users will have the
flexibility to choose and adopt the tools best suited for
their specific scenarios. When defining the signalling syn-
tax, backward compatibility with legacy JPEG and JPEG
2000 code streams will be provided as well as with other
existing standards and frameworks (e.g. those by SC 27,
SC 29, and W3C).
Based on the identified use cases and requirements, a
list of targeted tools to be included in the standard was
created [12]. These tools are classified into two main
domains: protection and authenticity.
1.3.1 Protection features include
• Protection tools to protect parts of any type of JPEG
images and/or associated metadata independently,
while ensuring backward and forward compatibility
with JPEG coding technologies;
• Handling of hierarchical levels of access and multiple
protection levels for metadata and image protection;
• File carving systems (e.g. resynchronisation points).
1.3.2 Authenticity features encompass
• Integrity check of image data and/or embedded
metadata;
• Avoidance of stripping off metadata, especially IPR
information;
• Versioning and/or tracking changes of an image
and/or associated metadata and solutions to support
embedding provenance information;
• Embedding of traceable information to allow
identification and assessment of the master image
and identify derived or modified versions of the
master image.
To understand how these functionalities can be inte-
grated and supported in current and future JPEG stan-
dards, it is important to comprehend the philosophy
behind the system architecture of JPEG standards out-
lined in the next section.
1.4 JPEG Systems
The JPEG committee, in the last 30 years, has developed
several methods that add new features to its core coding
solutions. The first and most used image coding stan-
dard JPEG-1 (ISO/IEC 10918-1) with its file format JFIF
(ISO/IEC 10918-5) allowed for the inclusion of additional
features by using a so-called APPmarkers mechanism. An
example of a commonly used APP marker is APP1 with
EXIFmetadata. However, the number of APPmarkers was
limited and many features offered through them were not
widely adopted.
Together with the JPEG 2000 standard (ISO/IEC 15444-
1), the method of a box-based file format was introduced
in 2000. This is a very flexible syntax where objects for
additional features in the file were encapsulated within a
binary structure as illustrated in Fig. 1.
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Fig. 1 Illustration of a box-based file structure
The key elements of this structure are as follows:
• The 32bit wide LBox field, which defines the length
of the box structure;
• The 32bit wide TBox field, which defines a unique
box type identifier (the feature);
• An optional extended length field XLBox, when the
box is larger than (232 − 1); and,
• An optional DBox field, which contains the payload
of the box, if necessary.
This method was widely used not only in JPEG 2000
but also in other standards like JPEG XR (ISO/IEC 15444-
2:2004/AMD3:2015) or in the ISO BaseMedia File Format
(ISOBMFF) in MPEG-4 (ISO/IEC 14496-12). Many fea-
tures were already added to these standards using the
same syntax.
In the last years, the JPEG committee has worked on a
systematic review and consolidation of all of its file for-
mats, functionalities and code stream syntax. The goal
was and is to define an overall framework — called JPEG
Systems— for future and legacy standards to ensure inter-
operability and functionality exchange between all JPEG
family standards. As a first result, the principles for the
system layer structure of JPEG standards are now defined
in part 1 of JPEG Systems — ‘packaging of informa-
tion using code streams and file formats’ (ISO/IEC TR
19566-1:2016) and part 2 — ‘transport mechanisms and
packaging’ (ISO/IEC TR 19566-2:2016).
As the box-based approach was identified as future-
proof, a method was developed to add boxes not only to
the newer standards in the JPEG family but also to the
JPEG-1 standard, for example to allow for extensions for
High Dynamic Range (HDR), extended bit depths, pri-
vacy and security features, universal metadata or 360°
images.
The concept of the method was first introduced in
the recently developed JPEG XT standard (ISO/IEC
18477-3) [13], which is part of a forward and backward
compatible suite of standards to JPEG-1. New extensions
include HDR, up to 16-bit integer coding, HDR floating-
point coding, lossless and near-lossless coding and alpha
channel coding. The main principle of the concept is to
cut a box structure into parts smaller than 64 k byte as this
is the limitation of an APP marker segment and to include
these parts into multiple instances of APP11 marker seg-
ments (see Fig. 2). The packet sequence number identifies
the specific part of the box. For more details please refer
to ISO/IEC 18477-3 JPEG XT: Box File Format [13].
It is important to stress that such approach inher-
ently enables backward and forward standard compli-
ance. Backward compatibility refers to the capability of
a decoder to interpret correctly both the older standard,
in particular JPEG-1, and the newly added functionality.
Forward compatibility refers to the capability of the older
standard or its legacy implementation to still being able
to interpret and decode the information it is assumed to
recognize in the expanded file format specification but to
ignore all new components that are connected to themore
recent standard specification such that it does not break-
down. The latter capability is extremely important since
it will guarantee that existing applications using legacy
codecs are not jeopardized.
Next steps for JPEG Systems are the implementa-
tion of system layer extensions in part 4 — ‘Privacy,
Security and IPR features’ (ISO/IEC 19566-4) and part
5 — ‘JPEG Universal Metadata Box Format (JUMBF)’
(ISO/IEC 19566-5).
An illustration for the use of the APP11 marker in the
legacy JPEG-1 standard is given in Fig. 3, which shows
also the compatibility to legacy JPEG-1 and newer JPEG
decoders.
1.5 Example applications
1.5.1 Secure transmorphing
Secure transmorphing can be used to protect privacy of
pictures in many applications, including in social media
Fig. 2 Organization of the APP11 marker segment for boxes
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Fig. 3 JPEG Systems - APP11 usage with box-based data
where access to the original can be restricted to autho-
rized recipients only, while allowing access to a pleasant
but privacy protected version of the image. Examples of
transmorphing are illustrated in Fig. 4 and can range from
the well-known scrambling to inpainting. Most existing
approaches are storing and transmitting both original
and processed versions of an image individually, which
requires more bandwidth and storage usage and man-
agement efforts. In this section, we discuss an algorithm
called JPEG transmorphing [14, 15], which morphs an
image to its processed version while preserving suffi-
cient information about the original image in the pro-
cessed image so that the original image can be recovered
later.
Let us assume that a digital image has been processed by
one or a series of image processing operations, for exam-
ple masking human faces in the picture with smiley faces.
The transmorphing process, illustrated in Fig. 5, can be
described by the following operations:
• Calculation of a Mask matrix, by first taking the
difference between the original and processed pixels
and generation of a binary image by applying a
thresholding operation on the image difference. The
values equal to 1 in the binary image are dilated to
match the Minimum Coded Unit (MCU) block
boundaries and then downsampled such that each
element points to a corresponding MCU block.
Therefore, the values equal to 1 in the Mask matrix
corresponds to a region or MCU blocks where the
image is modified, called modification region(s) or
modification blocks. The calculation of the Mask
matrix is performed for each of the three colour
channels in the image followed by merging the three
Mask matrices with logical OR operations.
• Creation of the sub-image according to the Mask
matrix, where the sub-image denotes pixels in the
original image corresponding to the modified regions.
The sub-image is encoded as a JPEG image, by setting
all DCT coefficients outside of the modified regions
in the original image to zero. If the original image is
already in JPEG format, this can be easily done by
transcoding the modified regions of the original
image to the sub-image.
• Embedding data in APPn markers by inserting the
byte stream of the JPEG sub-image, along with the
Fig. 4 Examples of secure transmorphing operations applied to an image
Temmermans et al. EURASIP Journal on Image and Video Processing  (2017) 2017:68 Page 6 of 9
Fig. 5 Privacy protection of a JPEG image with secure transmorphing
metadata about the sub-image, in one or several
application marker segments (APPn Markers) of the
JPEG file of the processed image. Specially, a security
option is available in the JPEG secure transmorphing
algorithm to meet the needs for image security and
privacy protection applications. The Secure JPEG
[16] framework is applied to the sub-image with a
selected image security tool, which can be either AES
(ISO/IEC 18033) or scrambling. The embedded
metadata signals three types of information: (i) the
size of the sub-image in bytes, (ii) the method by
which the sub-image is secured, and (iii) the Mask
matrix.
The recovery process, illustrated in Fig. 6, aims at restor-
ing the original image from the transmorphed image by
reversing the above-described transmorphing process:
• Extraction of the sub-image bytestream and metadata
from the APPn markers, and reconstruction of the
sub-image and Mask matrix followed by replacement
of the DCT coefficients corresponding to the
modification blocks of the morphed image with that
of the sub-image.
• In cases where the sub-image is secured, a secret key
needs to be provided to decrypt or descramble the
extracted sub-image.
A secure transmorphing algorithm involves four inputs:
the original image, the processed image, a mask thresh-
old, and a secret key. The original and processed images
can be in any format but are assumed to have the same
pixel resolution. The output transmorphed image and the
reconstructed image are all in JPEG format.
This algorithm can be deployed in a social network
setting enabling the secure exchange of image data. Appli-
cations exist nowadays that do enable this functionality.
An example is ProShare that was developed by EPFL
[17]. This application allows to post protected images to
Facebook, Twitter, WhatsApp .... Users need to register
via the ProShare app enabling them to assign (partially),
protect images and define access rights. Thereafter, pro-
tected images are posted to the respective social network.
Protected images can subsequently be rendered again by
other users using the ProShare app if they were assigned
the appropriate rights by picture owner. If users are not
registered on ProShare, they will not be able to view the
protected (parts of the) images uploaded via ProShare.
The secret key handling is done via this app and not via
the social network. In the particular case of ProShare,
an attribute-based encryption along with conventional
public key cryptography is used to achieve secure trans-
mission of secret keys and a fine-grained control over who
may view shared photos [14, 15].
Fig. 6 Recovery of the original from a secure transmorphed JPEG image
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Fig. 7 Image protection
This framework of course does not deliver full protec-
tion as it is the case in an analog world as well. People
can for example always take snapshots of the screen,
which is a weak point of every application reconstructing
digital content.What is important though is that the advo-
cated system allows for secure exchange of image content
between the right holders. If end-users are deliberately
overruling, the assigned rights they are placing themselves
in a vulnerable legal situation.
1.5.2 IPRmanagement for GLAM sector
As mentioned in the introduction, the GLAM sector
is dealing with images that have associated Intellectual
Property Rights (IPR). In this particular case, the access
to the images needs to be controlled based on specific
privacy policies or rules and IPR conditions. Therefore,
mechanisms are needed to both specify the policies and
enforce them. To be more specific, we consider here an
example implementation of controlled access to images
owned by a museum.
One relevant issue is who defines the policies. Twomain
options are either the service provider or the image owner,
assuming the case in which the image owner is not the
one that provides access to the image. In our example, the
service provider (the museum) could define the rules, but
they should be based on the original intellectual property
rights set by image owner.
The next issue is how to define the rules (policies);
i.e., on which kind of information we should base the
conditions to verify in order to decide if the access is
granted. Examples could include information on user,
image, action, context, etc. A specific example of a rule to
Fig. 8 Authorization of access to a protected image
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illustrate this could be only museum employees can view
the painting photo album during this month. In this case,
users are the museum employees, images are the specified
photo album, action is view and context is this month.
The third and final issue we consider is where to store
the rules and the images to which they apply. Images
could be even referenced in their repository. Rules could
be included as protected metadata in the image itself —
using JPEG Privacy and Security signaling syntax — or in
external systems.
The possible solution presented here provides all these
features [18]. The privacy policies are described with
XACML [19], which facilitates the possibility of having
different levels of granularity in the rules. As mentioned
before, this information can be included (or linked to)
within the image file, i.e., the APP11 marker segment in
case of a JPEG-1 file format. In our specific implemen-
tation, based on MIPAMS [18], the privacy policies are
included in the image with only a reference to an external
system that will handle everything (access to the privacy
policies, authorization of access to the images, protection
of the image, creation of the privacy policies, etc.).
The creation phase (Fig. 7, or how to protect an image
for further distribution and access, includes registering
the image (with the Workflow Manager WM and the
Object Registration Service ORS), adding the metadata,
uploading the image (to the Content Service CS), creating
its privacy rules (with the Policy Service PoS), encrypt-
ing if requested and adding privacy information. These
processes are complemented with the key management
(Protection Service PS) and some reporting (Reporting
Service RS).
In turn, the access phase or how to authorize access to
a protected image (Fig. 8), starts when a user intends to
render a privacy protected image. If authorization is given
by the Authorization Service (AS), the decryption keys are
sent to the user and the Application Workflow Manager
WM decrypts the protected image (parts) and renders the
image.
2 Conclusions
Integrating support for privacy and security function-
ality in existing image representation formats without
breaking legacy applications was until recently a quite
cumbersome activity. In this paper, it is demonstrated
how — while respecting backward and forward compat-
ibility with legacy implementations of image decoders —
this functionality can be integrated in the family of
coding technologies standardized by the JPEG commit-
tee. More particularly, we focused on JPEG-1 technologies
and explained how by exploiting and expanding its file
format and code stream syntax this could be achieved.
The proposed solution in the process of integration in the
JPEG Systems part 4— ‘Privacy, Security and IPR features’
(ISO/IEC 19566-4) and part 5 — ‘JPEG Universal Meta-
data Box Format (JUMBF)’ (ISO/IEC 19566-5) standards.
We illustrated the exploitation of this syntax in two appli-
cation contexts targeting completely different markets,
namely secure transmorphing in social networks photo
sharing and IPR management in GLAM applications.
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